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Abstract
The present research investigates the role of intuitive mental processing on cooperation in
experimental games involving structural inequality. Results from an experiment using con-
ceptual priming to induce intuitive mental processing provide the first evidence that cooper-
ation is promoted by intuition in an asymmetric context that distributes the gains from
cooperation unequally among a group. Therefore, the results extend our understanding of
the cognitive underpinnings of human cooperation by demonstrating the robustness of intui-
tive cooperation in games involving structural inequality regarding asymmetric gains from
cooperation. Additionally, the results provide the first successful conceptual replication of
the intuition-cooperation link using conceptual priming, therefore also contributing to the
debate about the validity of previous research in other contexts. Taken together, the present
research contributes to the literature on psychological and institutional mechanisms that
promote cooperation.
Introduction
One of the most widely investigated phenomena in human social life is why and how coopera-
tion can be sustained despite individual incentives to free-ride [1, 2]. Research has identified
many mechanisms that foster cooperation, among them direct and indirect reciprocity [3, 4],
spatial and multilevel selection [5, 6] as well as kin selection [7]. Yet, even in the absence of
such mechanisms, for instance in anonymous one-shot interaction over the internet, we
observe cooperation rates far above the theoretical predictions [8]. But why is that?
One explanation is that intuitions and norms that guide our real-world behavior carry over
to such artificial laboratory situations and trigger an evolutionary optimal response rather than
a game-theoretic optimum for this specific context. While the general mechanism of how this
happens is debated ([9] for an overview], the fact that cooperation exists in these situations is
quite robust. In this respect, ample amount of research supports the hypothesis that intuition
promotes cooperation and reciprocity, implicating that cooperation is a “system 1” process.
And in fact, theoretically grounded in dual-process theories of judgment and decision-making
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[10–14], several researchers reported positive effects of intuition on cooperation in social dilem-
mas as well as pro-sociality in general throughout several studies and thousands of observations.
For instance, the induction of an intuitive mindset through priming leads to increased coop-
eration in simple economic games [15] and promoting intuition by means of cognitive-load
increases generosity in resource allocation [16] as well in simple distribution tasks such as the
dictator game [17, 18]. Furthermore, people’s affective, emotional responses have been linked
to various domains of pro-social decision making, such as gratitude to pro-social behavior [19]
or altruistic interventions [20, 21].
But interestingly, the impact of intuition on cooperation has uniquely been measured in
symmetric contexts, meaning that costs and benefits are equally distributed among the partici-
pants. Yet, in real life, this is hardly ever the case. For instance, when cooperating with one’s
boss, it is quite plausible that he or she takes a larger portion of the gains from cooperation. If
you are remodeling your house, it might well be that one spouse likes the outcome much more
than the other. And in artificial social dilemma games, the gains from cooperation might also
be biased to benefit one party more than the other without changing the inherent characteris-
tics of the game (i.e., that it is individually optimal to free-ride and socially optimal to contrib-
ute). And in fact, previous research has addressed the question of heterogeneity in initial
endowments [22–24], marginal per capita returns [25, 26], and different perceptions in fairness
norms [27, 28] regarding public goods. In addition, heterogeneity was investigated by introduc-
ing leadership [29–33], which had positive results on cooperation. However, the general results
regarding heterogeneity seem diverging and Ledyard [34] points out that the effect of heteroge-
neity on cooperation is quite weak: “There does not yet appear to be enough evidence for
acceptance. In many cases there is conflicting evidence. (p. 158)”. This particularly applies to
the present context in which the differences in marginal returns are rather small and the inter-
action is one-shot (see [34] for a detailed discussion).
But what does intuition do in these cases of structural inequality? Given previous experi-
mental results that suggest that people cooperate more if deciding intuitively [15] and other
results that highlight a higher sensitivity towards equality under the same cognitive process
[17, 18, 35], intuition could have positive or negative effects on cooperation. The present
research is directly designed to test this question. Thus, the research is exploratory in the sense
that there are conflicting hypotheses based on existing research. If intuition favors cooperation
[15], then structural inequality should be irrelevant for the positive effect of intuition on coop-
eration. However, if intuition favors equality concerns rather than cooperativeness, as has been
suggested in various experiments, then intuition could even be detrimental for cooperation in
such situations that involve inequality. Therefore, the present research is designed to explore
these two potential outcomes by disentangling the cooperative element from equality.
Besides answering this important question and despite the overwhelming support of intui-
tive processes on pro-social decision making, especially the results reported in Rand et al. [15]
triggered a lot of attention in a debate around the replicability and generalizability of the intui-
tion-cooperation link. Although not the main focus of the present research, it also contributes
to the debate about whether or not intuition promotes cooperation. The conclusion that people
are intuitively cooperative in social dilemma games was challenged by several researchers [36,
37]. Interestingly, none of these replication attempts relied on conceptual priming, but used
decision-times or experimental inductions of time-pressure to measure or incur intuitive deci-
sion making. However, especially the effect of time pressure on cooperation has repeatedly
been shown [38–41]. Therefore, it is generally assumed that time-pressure puts people into an
intuitive mode, causing intuitive decision making [15].
Importantly, recent research qualified results on decision-time correlation vs. time pressure
manipulation by showing that decision time correlates with extreme responses while actually
Intuitive Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas
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experimentally manipulating decision times using time pressure increases cooperation and
decreases extreme selfishness. Correlational findings can therefore be explained by decision
conflict rather than by degree of intuitiveness [42]. However, there is still limited support by
exact nor conceptual replications that experimentally inducing intuition by alternative means
leads to increased cooperation. Addressing this issue in asymmetric games, therefore, provides
a viable avenue for research on the intuition-cooperation link.
Noteworthy, the present research does not make exact replications of the intuition-
cooperation link, and especially a replication of Study 8 reported in Rand et al. [15], obsolete.
As many scholars have noted [43–47], direct replications serve to investigate the reproducibil-
ity of a certain effect, whereas conceptual replication serves as a validation of a previously
established effect. The research question here was whether or not intuition promotes coopera-
tion in asymmetric contexts (i.e., as this has not been investigated before and is interesting due
to the ability to disentangle cooperativeness from equality), thus a direct replication of Rand
et al.’s Study 8 [15] would be irrelevant to the present context that involves asymmetry, despite
being an interesting (and relevant) research question in itself.
Summarizing, the present research is designed to test the impact of intuitive mental pro-
cessing on cooperation in a social dilemma game involving asymmetric payoffs to the partici-
pating parties. While this analysis presents a gap in the literature itself and is the main focus
of the research, the experiment also contributes to the debate about the previously established
relationship that intuition favors cooperation [15] and its validation within a different
context.
Materials and Method
Following recent sample size suggestions [47], a total of 250 HITs were created on Amazon
Mechanical Turk ([48], for validity of AMT as a research tool), with a stopping rule automati-
cally enforced upon completion of these HITs. The HIT was named “Decision-making task”
and the description of the task was as follows: “Work on a short task related to decision making
(max. 10–20 minutes), up to $1.00 bonus”. The keywords were “psychology questionnaire”
and “decision making”. Furthermore, the HIT required an approval rate for all requesters’
HITs greater than or equal 95 and the sample was restricted to locations in the US. There were
no time limits in either part of the experiment, but the maximum time for completion was 60
minutes. This limit did not time out any participant.
The study received approval by the institutional review board (Stanford University IRB
Panel on non-medical human subjects: No: 349, Panel 2, Protocol ID: 30556) and all partici-
pants gave their informed consent by checking the corresponding box before taking the study.
Out of the 250 participants, a total of 4 participants aborted the experiment before the assess-
ment of the dependent variable, leaving 246 for analysis. Participants (60% females) were on
average 29.37 years (SD = 8.65, ranging from 18–61). Cognitive processing was manipulated
using a conceptual prime that was well-established and used in previous research [49]. This
research has demonstrated the power of these specific primes to promote intuitive versus
reflective thinking in the domain of religious belief, and these findings were validated in a sub-
sequent study using a different method [50]. The present research used the identical prime
used in Rand et al.’s Study 8 [15, 49]. Prior to the measurement of the main dependent variable,
participants were asked to write about a time in their life where intuition worked out well, or
reflection worked out poorly (both promoting intuition); or the opposites (both promoting
reflection). Thus, while manipulating cognitive style, the procedure also counterbalanced
valence, to observe (and control for) potential effects of valence on cooperation, for which pre-
vious research could not establish a clear relationship [51–53].
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Subsequently, participants proceeded to a 4-person Public Goods Game (PGG), with the
form of
pij ¼ Xi  Ci þ 2 bj
X4
k ¼ 1 Cik ð1Þ
in which πij denotes the payoff of the individual player i of type j, Xi denotes the initial endow-
ment (40 cents), Ci the individual contribution (0 Ci Xi), and β the marginal per capital
return with β< 0.5 for all types j, ensuring a dilemma at the individual level.
Structural inequality was manipulated by having participants play the PGG in one of two
roles j, therefore manipulating their β. Two ‘low opportunity’ players each receive β = 0.2 (i.e.,
whoseMPCR is, therefore, 0.4), while two ‘high opportunity’ players each receive β = 0.3 (i.e.,
whoseMPCR is, therefore, 0.6). Thus, cooperation always led to inequality because participants
profited differently from the group project. After assessment of behavior, participants were
asked to answer a comprehension check to ensure that they have correctly understood the
nature of the social dilemma game (i.e., the critical issue that it is individually optimal to free-
ride, yet socially optimal to contribute everything to the public good). These questions were:
“What is best for you individually?” and “What is best for the group?” Answering options
were: invest everything vs. keep everything.
In addition to $0.30 base pay, all participants received $0.40 that they could invest in the
group project. Each cent invested into the group project was doubled. After the decision, fur-
ther demographics were assessed besides comprehension checks (see S1 and S2 Tables for
detailed experimental instructions).
Results and Discussion
The results support the stream of literature that shows that intuition increases cooperation. In
total, the results show an overall positive effect of intuition on cooperative decision-making in
the one-shot asymmetric social dilemma (for an overview of descriptive results, see Table 1, see
Fig 1 for mean cooperation rates by priming condition). Importantly, no variable differed as a
function of the manipulation except cooperation (i.e., the conditions did not over-represent
any age groups or gender and the manipulation had no impact on comprehension or the length
of the written paragraph).
In order to estimate the effect of intuition on cooperation, Tobit regressions were used to
account for the fact that subjects may contribute nothing or their entire endowments.
Table 1. Descriptive Results.
Intuition-Bad
(n = 66)
Reﬂection-Good
(n = 61)
Reﬂection-Bad
(n = 57)
Intuition-Good
(n = 62)
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Contribution (in %) 34.96 41.08 35.82 40.69 50.48 43.51 40.81 40.60
Age 29.56 7.54 30.02 9.70 30.37 10.18 27.79 7.01
Gender (0 = M, 1 = F) 0.47 0.36 0.39 0.38
Comprehension I .89 .31 .90 .30 .86 .35 .97 .18
Comprehension II .98 .17 .97 .18 .98 .13 .92 .28
Paragraph length 785 356 782 248 811 268 759 282
Notes: All respondents were US-based, comprehension I (“What is best for you individually?”), comprehension 2 addresses group level (“What is best for
the group?”). There are no statistical differences of age, gender, comprehension checks, and paragraph length with respect to manipulations. Paragraph
length is indicated by characters in the statement.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0131562.t001
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Throughout all models, robust standard errors were calculated. The experimental manipula-
tions were dummy-coded (e.g., intuition = 1 if an intuitive mindset was induced, and 0 other-
wise; or valence = 1 if positive, and 0 otherwise). Table 2 displays the regression models. Model
1 shows that intuition positively affects cooperation (p = 0.034) in the absence of any controls,
while valence (p = 0.707) as well as the interaction (p = 0.199) do not significantly predict
cooperation. Model 2 controls for age, gender, comprehension, as well as the length of the
Fig 1. Mean Rates of Cooperation. Cooperation is displayed by conceptual priming (Intuition: intuition good/
reflection bad vs. Reflection: intuition bad/ reflection good). Error bars represent 95%-level confidence
intervals. Intuition refers to primes that promote intuition or inhibit reflection (intuition good, reflection bad),
reflection refers to primes that promote reflection or inhibit intuition (reflection good, intuition-bad). Based on
n = 246 observations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0131562.g001
Table 2. Results from Tobit Regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intuition 46.4771** (2.13; 21.83) 48.9130** (2.35; 21.76) 46.4098** (2.12; 21.89) 49.2492* (1.82; 27.02)
Valence 7.6360 (0.38; 20.29) 6.3109 (0.32; 19.45) 7.6442 (0.38; 20.29) 7.6890 (0.38; 20.29)
Mar. Return 0.4577 (0.03; 14.69) 2.9836 (0.15; 20.29)
Intuition x Valence -37.7958 (1.29; 29.32) -37.9254 (-1.32; 28.83) -37.7073 (-1.28; 29.49) -38.3261 (-1.29; 29.68)
Intuition x Mar. Return -5.2638 (-0.18; 29.41)
Age 1.56914* (1.71; 0.92)
Gender 8.5931 (0.60; 14.42)
Compreh. -66.5323***(-3.32; 20.03)
Paragraph length 0.0415 (0.02; 1.66)
Constant 9.7746 (0.65, 15.07) -26.5195 (-0.58; 45.42) 9.5625 (0.58; 16.63) 8.3932 (0.47; 17.94)
N 246 246 246 246
Pseudo R-squared 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.004
Notes: Numbers present unstandardized regression coefﬁcients, t-values are presented in parentheses before robust standard errors,
*p<0.10,
**p<0.05,
***p < .001, dependent variable: cooperation in percentage, coding: Intuition, valence, marginal return were dummy-coded (1 = intuition, positive, high/
0 = reﬂection, negative, low), age (continuous), gender (1 = Female, 0 = Male), comprehension (combined measure from two items: 1 = yes, 0 = no),
paragraph length (continuous, number of characters).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0131562.t002
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written paragraph and corroborates the initial findings: The effect of intuition remains signifi-
cant (p = 0.035).
Next, the impact of theMPRC was tested. Using a simple t-test, cooperation did not differ
depending on the marginal return (p = 0.710). In Tobit regressions,MPCR was also dummy-
coded to represent high (1) or low (0) opportunity players. First of all and consistent with
reviews on heterogeneity in public goods [34], no main effect ofMPCR on cooperation was
observed in this one-shot game (p = 0.748, Model 3). Furthermore, a Tobit regression assessed
the main effect as well as the interaction effect of the intuition prime andMPCR (high vs. low
MPCR). There is no significant interaction between promoting intuition andMPCR (see
Model 4). Controlling for age, gender, or paragraph length does not change the main result
that intuition favors cooperation. Additionally controlling for comprehension in various mod-
els that involve a combination of none, some, or all control variables produces result that are at
least marginal significant (all p’s< 0.10)
Summarizing, besides the conceptual replication of previous results [15], the present results
supports the positive relationship of intuition and cooperation. While intuition promotes
cooperation even in a game with structural inequality, no interaction occurred between the
manipulation and the role that the participant decided in.
Conclusion
The present research showed that intuitive mental processing—induced by conceptual priming
—promotes cooperation even in a social dilemma that does not allocate the gains from coopera-
tion equally among the participants. Thus the results advance our understanding of the cogni-
tive underpinnings of cooperation in games where participants benefit unequally from
contributions to the public good. Many real-life decisions involve asymmetric gains from joint
cooperation, yet the effect of intuition on these types of dilemmas has thus far been neglected in
research. The present research was designed to fill that gap in the literature. The results deserve
some discussion and the intuition-cooperation link deserves much more research attention.
First, the results provide the first successful conceptual replication from an independent
research lab of the highly debated results presented in Rand et al. [15], using the conceptual
priming technique [49] rather than the uniquely utilized time-pressure manipulation [36, 37].
By means of conceptual replication, the results therefore validate the conceptual priming find-
ing by showing that it extends to social dilemmas involving structural inequality. Naturally, this
conceptual replication does not render exact replications useless [43–47]. For instance, future
research could investigate whether expertise effects ([15], Study 9) also moderate the effect of
intuition on cooperation under structural inequality. In addition, a large-scale replication effort
involving many independent labs should attempt replication of the basic effects reported in
Rand et al.’s [15] studies that use conceptual priming to induce an intuitive mindset.
Second, this novel evidence presented here suggests that intuition favors cooperation when
equality concerns would lead to non-cooperation. While various research might suggest that
intuition may activate equality concerns that may have detrimental effects on cooperation
under structural inequality, the results show that intuitive cooperation overrules fairness con-
cerns in asymmetric contexts. The fact that promoting intuition nonetheless increases contri-
butions suggests that intuition favors efficiency more strongly than equality, or perhaps a more
general tendency to cooperate [54]. In other words, the fact that cooperation gains are equally
distributed is not the underlying cause of the intuition-cooperation link. Importantly, the pres-
ent context involved two players with highMPCR. Cooperation between the two already paid
off. However, in the symmetric case, cooperation between two is also sufficient to avoid losses
from cooperation. Future research could investigate if two different types of players in a group
Intuitive Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas
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facilitates cooperation, for instance by reducing perceived uncertainty about others behavior.
This effect could potentially be independent ofMPCR and one way to investigate this hypothe-
sis is to give the two types different names (e.g., red and blue players).
Third, future research can address whether the specific framing of the study (e.g., by means
of instructions) affect the outcome in this game. For instance, the present research also relied
on rather vivid instructions (e.g., “Each cent invested in doubled.”) Possibly, this vivid framing
might be associated with triggering cooperative responses, especially if in an intuitive mindset.
The present research relied on instructions that mirrored Rand et al.’s [15] instruction as much
as possible, but future research could systematically vary the vividness of the instructions, for
example by stating theMPCR rather than the phrase to “double each cent”.
Fourth, this research also shows that replication attempts should involve several manipula-
tions before dismissing previously published research results, especially if these studies used
several methods to show the effect initially. As Rand et al.’s [15, 55] initial result has been chal-
lenged by several null findings relying on the same induction of intuition [36, 37], none of the
research assessed the effect with a multi-method approach before dismissing it as non-replica-
ble or invalid in other contexts. The results reported here suggest that process-oriented manip-
ulations (e.g., priming) can be more effective in activating the psychological concept of interest.
Importantly, the effect sizes (R2’s) in the present research were quite small. Thus, future
research could also address the sizes of certain effects and compare how different tools to pro-
mote cooperation perform relatively. This is particularly important when it comes to using psy-
chological principles outside the lab (e.g., in domains around behavioral science and policy,
marketing, organizational behavior, etc.).
Finally, slightly changing the game to involve unequal players may be enough to overcome
expertise effects, similar to changing the framing of the game [38]. Research has shown that
subjects recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk may become too experienced to be receptive to
subtle effects of primes ([15], Fig 3a therein). Ideally, this would be tested using a design which
manipulates structural inequality, intuitive vs. reflective decision making, and measures sub-
jects’ experience. To sum up, the present research provided further results on the intuition-
cooperation link in a context that involves structural inequality, implying that symmetric gains
are not a pre-requisite for intuitive cooperation.
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